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 As the migration crisis has unfolded in Europe, driven largely by confl ict and instability in the Middle East and Africa, 
European countries have had to confront the dichotomy between what they perceive to be the protection of their 
national interests and an obligation to abide by humanitarian principles. These events have manifested in many 
prominent nativist anti-immigration and anti-refugee political movements that have tested the relevance, applicability 
and suitability of several international institutions and instruments. Competing and confl icting approaches can be 
identifi ed among the primary actors: those in the political realm are being driven by a security and law enforcement 
narrative towards their migration policies, while NGOs and international organisations are following a human rights and 
humanitarian protection narrative. To some, even the approach of the NGOs remains disjointed, uncoordinated and 
fractured. In this context, a number of questions are being raised about whether the implementation of international 
migration law by a number of actors such as politicians, national leaders, law enforcement and the humanitarian 
agencies and civil society adequately balances these competing approaches. How can law enforcement and 
administrative agencies ensure that there is a functional and coherent balance between the national security narrative 
and the migrant rights narrative while, at the same time, seeking to address the needs of both their governments and 
vulnerable migrant groups? This is a conundrum that this paper seeks to answer. 
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1. Introduction 
Driven largely by conflict and instability in the Middle East and Africa, the so-called migration or refugee crisis has taken 
the form of an exogenous shock that has challenged the international migration system. It has, first and foremost, 
made the distinctions between migrants and refugees harder to draw, challenging the existing international migration 
framework that is based on a distinction between the two. It has also resulted in a raft of new initiatives and instruments 
on how best to utilise the structure, norms and institutions of current migration and refugee systems that have been in 
place in Europe since the post-Second World War crisis.2 Though the response has been commendable in many places, 
it is still hard to find someone without a strong opinion on how the migrant crisis should be, or should have been, 
handled better.3  
There is also a great diversity of perspectives on what exactly would improve the migration and refugee situation in 
Europe.4 One of the key issues at the heart of this great difference in perspective between the key actors, like national 
leaders, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), like humanitarian and civil society actors, is what their mandated 
role is within the migration and refugee framework. Whereas INGOs and NGOs are predominantly concerned with the 
protection and proper treatment of asylum seekers, migrants and refugees,5 government entities (and their contractors/
subsidiaries such as border control agencies, coastguards and law enforcement agencies), while paying lip service to 
protection principles, are largely focused on the maintenance of law and order, national security and the concerns and 
fears of local populations.6 As Dr Volker Türk, speaking on behalf of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
pointed out, 
We have seen – and continue to see – many heartening expressions of compassion and solidarity 
in response to refugees, [but] we also see divisive politics and xenophobia gaining traction, 
amplified by uninformed discourse in the media and other public fora. This also plays out in 
current debates around threats related to terrorism and refugee flows.7 
Given this ‘uninformed discourse’ and the prominence of anti-migration and anti-refugee sentiment, European countries 
have had to confront considerable friction between ‘migration management’ and ‘protection’ while also abiding by 
their humanitarian principles and legal obligations under international law.8 
As noted at the Declaration of the High-level Dialogue in 2013, migration is a complex and cross-cutting issue that 
should be addressed in a ‘coherent, comprehensive and balanced manner’.9 Unlike national or European Union (EU) law, 
international migration law is not, in any meaningful sense, a distinct branch of law with its own legislature or a single 
instrument, but is rather understood as an umbrella term covering a complex framework of principles and rules that 
2 See Political Declaration by European Union (EU) and African Leaders, Valletta Summit on Migration, 11–12 November 2015: ‘Valletta Declaration’.
3 See, for example, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Better Protecting Refugees in the EU and Globally (December 2016); also 
see the joint statement submitted by 104 NGOs which noted that certain proposals by the European Commission would mean that ‘Europe risks 
torpedoing its human rights foreign policy, and undermining the right to asylum internationally’: Amnesty International Joint Statement, ‘European 
Commission ‘compacts’ Represent Responsibility-sharing not Responsibility-shirking’ (27 June 2016); Editorial, ‘Europe’s Response to Refugees has 
been Pitiful’, The Observer (15 May 2016).
4 See, for example, Susi Dennison and Josef Janning, ‘Bear any Burden: How EU Governments can Manage the Refugee Crisis’, European Council on 
Foreign Relations Policy Brief (2017); EY, Managing the Migration Crisis: From Panic to Planning (2016).
5 See, for instance, the mandates of Council of Europe (CoE) Special Representative for Migrants and Refugees, which stipulates that he is ‘responsible 
for gathering information on the fundamental rights of migrants and refugees in Europe, including through fact-finding missions, and making 
proposals for action.’; also see the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, para 1: ‘acting under the authority of the General 
Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection … and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees’, 
International Labour Organization (ILO), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Migration Human Rights and Governance, the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) notes that although the ‘IOM has no legal protection mandate, the fact remains that its activities contribute to protecting 
human rights, having the effect, or consequence, of protecting persons involved in migration’, while Principle 1 of the IOM’s Migration Governance 
Framework is ‘adherence to international standards and fulfilment of migrant’s rights’. With regard to some of the most prominent NGOs operating 
in the field and advocating at the regional and international level, similar mandates can be found at Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), Médecins Sans Frontières and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) among others.
6 See, for example, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Dr François Crépeau, UN GA DOC A/72/173 (19 July 2017), 
paras 19, 22–24. 
7 UNHCR, Open Briefing to United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, 5 April 2017.
8 See, for instance, Regulation 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, in which the Preamble frames its efforts in the context of ‘resolving unprecedented migratory flows towards Union territory in 
a comprehensive manner, including by reinforcing border management to better manage growing mixed migratory flows’. while ‘Heads of State 
or Government stressed the need to tackle the dramatic situation at the external borders and to strengthen the controls at those borders’ and ‘It 
is necessary to monitor the crossing of the external borders efficiently, address migratory challenges and potential future threats at the external 
borders, ensure a high level of internal security within the Union.’ Also see Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, 
para. 2: ‘European integrated border management is central to improving migration management.’ Also see Valletta Declaration, footnote 2 above, 
where the primary concern is identified as the pressure placed upon affected states in terms of ‘humanitarian and security challenges’, followed 
by a need to respond decisively to ‘manage migration flows in all their aspects’. However, the Declaration states that such a response will be in ‘full 
respect for human rights and the sovereignty of participating states, taking into account national legislations and specificities’, according a degree 
of autonomy to the states. More recently, see European Commission, ‘European Agenda on Migration: Good progress in Managing Migration Flows 
Needs to be Sustained’ (6 September 2017), and associated documents. 
9 Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, UN GA DOC A/68/L.5 (1 October 2013), para. 1.
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regulate the international obligations of states with regard to migrants.10 However, despite some movement towards a 
universal regime and promising developments, such as the New York Declaration on Migrants and Refugees,11 the law 
has developed in a piecemeal fashion over time and contains a number of different applicable instruments, depending 
on context.12 
This research paper aims to analyse the narratives at play in the nexus between key EU institutions that help to shape or 
determine the applicable international legal framework in Europe and the NGOs that advocate for the implementation 
of such instruments. The paper thus asks how these two competing narratives interact with each other, whether they 
clash with each other and whether there can be a balance between the two. It also explores the consequences such 
disparities ultimately present to the norms, obligations and principles of international migration and refugee law. As a 
case study, the EU-Turkey statement is then briefly examined as paradigmatic of these competing narrative approaches. 
Research for the paper is based on the reports, publications and press releases of international organisations and NGOs, 
EU legal texts, statements and treaties as well as interviews conducted with the UNHCR, the Council of Europe and 
NGOs working with refugees and migrants in destination countries in Europe, transit countries like Turkey and source 
countries like Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan. When discussing national actors that are largely driving the security 
narrative, the paper makes reference to organisations that have been at the forefront of responding to the refugee influx 
in Europe, including EU Member State governments and law enforcement agencies like Frontex (the European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency). The mandates and positions of the NGOs that are driving the more rights-based approaches 
are elaborated upon, along with the views of organisations that are seeking to find a collective solution that upholds 
the rights of refugees such as the UNHCR and the Council of Europe. References to the migration and refugee crises 
pertain to the responses to refugee arrivals in Europe, and show the complexities that exist in the discussion around 
contemporary migration and refugees.
2. The crises within the refugee and migration crisis 
There is a real tension at play in international migration governance. The stark differences in principles, values and 
priorities among the various actors involved are not an abstract or merely contextual problem. Such differences can 
have concrete, tangible and practical consequences, affecting both vertical and horizontal relationships between 
international organisations (such as the EU and UN) and national actors within the different bodies of the nation-state 
bureaucracies, and between NGOs and national authorities and quangos on the ground. These differences heighten 
the rhetoric around the severity of the problem and prevent a systematic engagement. Competing mandates and 
agendas of countries and organisations, meanwhile, divert attention from the broader goal of protecting human safety 
and dignity. While defending the security interests of the state is important, to do so while observing international 
human rights and constitutional fundamental rights standards is a balancing act.13 Human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights – these values are embedded in all EU treaties that govern the EU.14
10 European Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Law Relating to Asylum, Borders and Immigration (2014), 
pp. 12–14.
11 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN GA DOC A/RES/71/1 (3 October 2016) outlines a broad set of commitments relating to the 
human rights of all refugees and migrants, alongside many specific commitments. It is hoped that the New York Declaration will be followed by 
a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration sometime in 2018 and that a comprehensive refugee and migration framework will be 
adopted.
12 This framework includes, at the international level, instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; relevant conventions of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO); the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention 1951); the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons; the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; the Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime; the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea; the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue; the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, among other regional instruments such as the European Social Charter ETS No. 
035, European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers ETS No. 093, and the European Convention on Human Rights ETS No. 005.
13 Mary Arden, Human Rights and European Law. Building New Legal Orders. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
14 See European Union, ‘Human Rights’ Narrative on Protecting Fundamental Rights within the EU and Promoting Human Rights Globally’. Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code), is overt in its reference to security concerns stating in the Preamble that ‘[b]order control is in the interest not only 
of the Member State at whose external borders it is carried out but of all Member States which have abolished border control. Border control should 
help to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and to prevent any threat to the Member States’ internal security, public policy, 
public health and international relations.’ However, Article 4 of the same Regulation also obliges Member States to act in full compliance with relevant 
EU and international human rights law, including those relating to international protection of migrants and refugees. Also see Regulation (EU) No. 
1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), para. 
1 which states that ‘EUROSUR will provide those authorities and the Agency with the infrastructure and tools needed to improve their situational 
awareness and reaction capability at the external borders of the Member States of the Union (‘external borders’) for the purpose of detecting, 
preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.’ 
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In Europe, high-profile NGOs have not minced their words. Human Rights Watch, for instance, stated that ‘individual 
member states have rolled back asylum rights at a national level and the European Commission has proposed an 
overhaul of the common European asylum system that is informed by a logic of deterrence [rather] than a commitment 
to basic human rights’.15 In many ways, we are witnessing less of a migration crisis per se, but rather a political crisis 
resulting from the failure to find true common ground and universal, effective solutions, and to implement those 
solutions with the required resources and oversight. 
Although international migration law, and refugee law in particular, provides for the right to apply for asylum and 
places an obligation on states to process and potentially recognise such persons as deserving of protection,16 states 
in the EU have often responded with policies and practices aimed at restricting access to the protections provided 
by international law. Amnesty International, for instance, has argued that ‘rather than creating a bold, orderly system 
providing safe avenues for people to seek protection in Europe, European leaders have increasingly focused on blocking 
borders and negotiating with human rights violating governments to stop them coming’.17
Across Europe, at both the EU and national levels, the failure to enact coherent and consistent migration policies has 
contributed to the widespread dissatisfaction we can see in many a country’s immigration policy.18 This dissatisfaction 
has led to angry and resentful nativist anti-immigrant backlashes, lower public support for admitting immigrants and 
refugees, and an unwillingness to help them once they are in the country.19 
As François Crépeau, the UN Special Rapporteur, pointed out recently, in Europe right now the nationalist-populist 
narrative is dominating the political discourse and the ‘real crisis in Europe resides in the lack of political will, resulting 
from the absence of a common political vision as to how migration and mobility are part of Europe’s present and future’.20 
Whereas aspects of migration, and refugee law in particular, trigger rights and obligations of protection under the 
rubric of humanitarian action,21 what we can observe in many circumstances is rather a security-dominated approach, 
predicated on the crisis narrative and broader policies aimed at deterring immigration.22 Across Europe, migration 
policies are largely being driven by a security and law enforcement narrative in the political realm which is often 
predicated on a fuzzy conception of ‘others’ as an uncertain, untrustworthy or unwelcome presence in society. As 
Crépeau noted, 
Public discussion of these factors has been extremely shallow, often confined to little more than 
scaremongering about ‘benefit scroungers’ and migrants ‘stealing jobs.’ Rather than address the 
reasons behind migration, states often respond to increased migration movements by creating 
and progressively increasing barriers to mobility, narrowly focusing on securitization, repression 
and deterrence.23 
Religious, racial and ethnic prejudice, fear and political and cultural resentment also seem to play a significant role, 
encouraging greater securitised migration policies and actions towards migrants from the Middle East and Africa.24 
In the EUROSUR Regulation, a brief reference is made to humanitarian considerations, noting that ‘it is recognised in this Regulation that migratory 
routes are also taken by persons in need of international protection’ (para. 3), while Article 2(4) requires compliance with fundamental rights.
15 Human Rights Watch, ‘EU Policies Put Refugees at Risk: An Agenda to Restore Protection’ (23 November 2016).
16 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02, provides for the right to asylum in 
Article 18 while Article 19 enshrines the principle of non-refoulement contained in Article 33 of the Geneva Convention relating to the status of 
refugees (Geneva Convention 1951). 
17 Amnesty International, ‘A Blueprint for Despair: Human Rights Impact of the EU-Turkey Deal’ (2017), p. 5.
18 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Dr François Crépeau, UN GA DOC A/72/173 (19 July 2017), para. 31.
19 Ibid., para. 20; also see EUROPOL, Terrorism Situation and Analysis (TE-SAT) Report (2017), which notes that ‘The migration phenomenon affecting 
the European continent and the perceived threat from Islamisation remain key topics on the RWE [right-wing extremist] agenda and have been used 
by the right-wing scene to induce public opinion to adopt its xenophobic and Islamophobic position. These topics are exploited to spread fear and 
concern.’
20 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants Concludes His Follow up Country 
Visit to Greece’ (16 March 2016).
21 See, for instance, Preamble to the Geneva Convention 1951: ‘recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees’; also 
see, International Organisation for Migration, Migration Governance Framework, Principle 1, footnote 5. States also regularly reiterate this notion in 
collective documents, for instance in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, paragraphs 5–6 which firmly grounded the subsequent 
commitments within existing international legal obligations, including to fully protect the safety, dignity and human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all migrants and refugees, regardless of their status, at all times and to devise responses to large-movements with full respect for 
international human rights law and other relevant standards.
22 Danish Refugee Council, ‘Implications of the EU’s outsourcing of protection responsibilities and migration control’ (March 2017), p. 3; Also see, 
Alison Gerard and Sharon Pickering ‘Crimmigration: Criminal Justice, Refugee Protection and the Securitisation of Migration’, in The Routledge 
Handbook of International Crime and Justice Studies (London: Routledge 2013), p. 595–597.
23 François Crépeau, ‘U.N. Rapporteur: We Need a Long-term Strategy for Human Migration’, Refugees Deeply (8 June 2017).
24 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Open Briefing to United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (5 
April 2017); also see Daniel Howden, ‘The Manufacturing of Hatred: Scapegoating Refugees in Central Europe’, Refugees Deeply (14 December 2016).
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This triggers risk-reduction policies and actions with a greater focus on monitoring, classifying and managing incoming 
groups, and interdicting and intercepting ‘illegal’ and irregular migration prior to asylum claims. Key international 
instruments, which focus on criminalising irregular and illegal immigration by organised criminal groups, include 
supplementary instruments to the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime; the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and the Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. However, these do not adequately recognise the complexity of the human 
compulsions, motivations and aspirations that drive migrants to these channels.25
This is of concern and problematic for many reasons. But the main issue is that if contemporary migration and refugee 
policy increasingly reflects the broader political discourse of migration as a security concern, then there is a real risk of 
human rights getting crowded out – or, worse, subsumed – by an all-encompassing security-oriented discourse.26 The 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights noted, 
There is a steady advance of the discourse of ‘illegality’ in migration law and policy. While the 
early EU legislation refrains from using the terminology, after about 2003, it becomes common 
currency appearing again and again throughout documents, legislation and decisions. This trend 
is of questionable consistency with the human rights obligations of the member states and their 
activities within the Council of Europe. As regards human rights, all the EU measures discussed 
above confirm, at least in their preambles, that they comply with the EU’s fundamental rights 
obligations. Explicit references are made to member states’ duties under the ECHR and, in asylum 
related measures to the UN Refugee Convention. However, the recognition of these commitments 
does not appear to influence, in practice, the approach towards criminalisation.27 
3. Siloed approaches: competing narratives to complex issues
At the regional level, what can generally be seen at the regional level is different actors that do not see eye-to-eye on 
several issues relating to the status, protection and governance of migrants and refugees. International organisations 
and NGOs can try to hammer out a human-rights approach as much as possible, but many actors simply do not see 
it in the same way. As such, the approaches are fragmented and siloed, in that they are often in tension while seeking 
starkly different objectives.28 
For instance, in the EU, despite a set of legally binding standards in the common European asylum system, there 
are evidently major differences and disparities among the Member States. Reception conditions, administrative 
procedures, treatment, detention – these are simultaneously reflective, and the consequences, of a fragmented and divided 
legal system.29 
It is perhaps fair to say that this is a problem widely visible in public international law: domestic authorities remain 
the primary duty-bearers and, to a greater or lesser extent, there are very few countries that could be said to not have 
visible enforcement or implementation gaps.30 A Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council in 2016 stated 
There are significant structural weaknesses and shortcomings in the design and implementation 
of European asylum and migration policy, which the crisis has exposed. The EU now needs to put 
in place the tools to better manage migration flows in the medium and long term, in line with the 
approach set out in the European Agenda on Migration.31 
25 For a study on an ecosystem approach to understanding the smuggling of migrants from the perspective of migrants, see International 
Organization for Migration (IOM)/Samuel Hall, ‘Migrant Smuggling to Canada – An Enquiry into Vulnerability and Irregularity through Migrant Stories’ 
(2017). For a discussion on deconstructing migrant–smuggler perspectives and understanding migrant-smuggling networks, see Nassim Majidi and 
Saagarika Dadu, ‘Human Smugglers Roundtable’, Open Democracy (2017); and Nassim Majidi, ‘Communities of Smugglers and the Smuggled’, Open 
Democracy (2017) 
26 See Alessandro De Giorgi, ‘Immigration Control, Post-Fordism, and Less Eligibility: A Materialist Critique of the Criminalization of Immigration across 
Europe’, Punishment & Society, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2010), p. 149, who states that public discourses ‘have become powerful catalysts for the consolidation of 
a punitive governance of migrations revolving around a process of “categorical criminalisation” of immigrants’.
27 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications (2011), p. 17.
28 See, for instance, para. 2, footnote 8 of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, 
which states that ‘[t]he aim is to manage the crossing of the external borders efficiently and address migratory challenges and potential future 
threats at those borders, thereby contributing to addressing serious crime with a cross-border dimension and ensuring a high level of internal 
security within the Union. At the same time, it is necessary to act in full respect for fundamental rights and in a manner that safeguards the free 
movement of persons within the Union.’
29 For instance, Regulation 562/2006, the Schengen Border Code, adopted by all Member States except Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; 
also see UNHCR Guidelines, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, December 2011, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV, and UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative 
Analysis and Recommendations for Law and Practice, March 2010.
30 See, for instance, Directorate-General for External Policies, ‘Current Challenges for International Refugee Law, with a Focus on EU Policies and EU 
Cooperation with the UNHCR’, Briefing Paper XPO/B/DROI/2012/15 (2013), pp. 10–14.
31 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System 
and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe’, COM (2016) 197 final, p. 2.
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In the European context, the variable implementation of the universal system reflects a shift from what could be 
considered a ‘democratic’ immigration discourse versus a ‘populist’ immigration discourse. The UN Human Rights 
Council, for instance, has ‘expressed concern at the increasing trend of xenophobia and hostility towards migrants in 
societies and the criminalisation of irregular migration, which might have a negative impact in the fulfilment of human 
rights globally’.32
All these systemic issues leave vulnerable migrant populations at risk of further harm, often unable to exercise their 
rights.33 A key issue is thus: how does one work around these issues, facilitating greater dialogue and effective cooperation, 
as is – or should be – required by the international treaties and other instruments that make up international migration 
law? Providing simple answers to this question is not easy and first entails an analysis of the competing approaches 
currently evident in European discourse.
4. The rights-based approach: complementary or distinct?
The human rights and humanitarian protection narrative generally prevails among prominent NGOs and international 
organisations. At the same time, national authorities are often reported to participate minimally when these groups try 
to engage them on issues around human rights cooperation.34 
The perspective of many international organisations and NGOs is, in broad terms, that human rights norms are best 
understood as integrated into the security policies of a state or as complementary to such security policies. At a 
briefing to the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) in April 2017, UNHCR stated that: 
‘international refugee law does not pose an obstacle when it comes to addressing security concerns. On the contrary, 
security considerations have been at the forefront of the international refugee protection regime from the outset.’35 
While stating that asylum authorities should cooperate with security and intelligence services, UNHCR argued that 
both ‘have a role to play in identifying persons who may fall within the scope of an exclusion clause or who otherwise 
require appropriate measures to ensure the security of the host country and its community’. In the same statement, 
the UNHCR acknowledged that ‘[i]n practice, however, security concerns often seem to overshadow equally pressing 
humanitarian and protection considerations’.36 Ultimately arguing that ‘[i]nternational refugee law provides for 
safeguards and mechanisms to protect those in need of international protection from persecution, conflict, and 
violence – including terrorism – while bearing in mind the security interests of host countries and their communities’, 
the UNHCR emphasised a complementary approach to migration and refugee issues that is seemingly at odds with 
national and EU approaches.37
This argument is largely premised on the notion that the international legal framework, based on the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, provides not just basic principles of treatment and protection, but also a limited set of principles that enable 
states to satisfy their security concerns while conforming with the Convention. Core aspects of international refugee 
law such as non-refoulement, and the broader notion of ‘complementary protection’, prohibit states from returning a 
refugee or asylum seeker to territories where there is a particular threat to their life or where there is a risk of torture or 
cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment.38 Article 1F of the 1951 Convention provides exclusions for those who are 
responsible for certain offences, such as cases where, even if an individual qualifies as a refugee fleeing persecution 
(under Article 1A), there are serious reasons to believe that the individual in question has committed ‘crimes against 
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity’, a ‘serious non-political crime’ or ‘has been guilty of acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations’, which is commonly understood to broadly encompass many acts, 
including several forms of terrorist activity.39 
Similarly, the Council of Europe tends to take a rights-based approach, focusing on the complex role of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in the context of migration and refugees. Backed by the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Council of Europe’s approach is starkly different from that taken by the European Union, with the latter 
primarily focused on ‘migration management’, which includes medium- to long-term priorities such as reducing the 
incentives for irregular migration, saving lives, securing external borders, strengthening the common asylum policy 
and developing a new policy on legal migration.40 
32 UN DOC A/HRC/35/L.28 (19 June 2017), p. 4.
33 Nils Muiznieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Stop Your Backsliding, Europe’, The New York Times (Opinion) (14 March 2016), 
noted that ‘the refugee crisis unfolding along the borders of the European Union has elicited a chaotic response. There is a clear danger that the 
union and its member states are losing their way and are at risk of backsliding on fundamental commitments.’
34 See, for instance, Amnesty International, ‘The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s 
Borders’ (2014), pp. 9–11.
35 UNHCR, Open Briefing to United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (5 April 2017).
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Geneva Convention 1951, Article 33, as well as a corresponding provisions such as Article 3 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984).
39 See, for instance, UN Security Council Resolution 1377, which notes that ‘acts of international terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations, and that the financing, planning and preparation of as well as any other form of support for acts of international 
terrorism are similarly contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’. 
40 See for instance, European Commission, ‘Migration: Towards a European Agenda on Migration’.
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Like the NGO sector, the Council of Europe’s various organs, including the Commission for Human Rights and relatively 
newly appointed Special Representative for Migrants and Refugees, advocate for a largely rights-based approach for 
Member State governments, with attention focused on the non-EU Balkan States and Turkey.41
Other actors in the region play a similar role, often invoking obligations under international law as a means of ensuring 
that their migrant or refugee advocacy takes place firmly within the international legal framework. Various NGOs, 
particularly those with a broad human rights advocacy agenda, as well as specialised interest groups that focus on 
particular migrants (such as unaccompanied minors or conditions of detention), are also critical to understanding 
the narrative inputs into the policy discourse space. Grassroots activists, human rights defenders and civil society 
organisations rarely appear to pay much attention to security matters and the role this plays in drafting and 
implementing migration and refugee policies. Rather, they keep their focus on thematic issues such as the protection 
of migrants or providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and other vulnerable populations.42 Particularly for those 
working on the ground, many of the mandates of such organisations and actors are oriented around the provision 
of care or shelter or are otherwise directed towards the realisation of the rights contained within international legal 
instruments. Strongly rights-oriented discourse appears to prevail among many of these groups in their international 
and regional advocacy efforts, as is evidenced, to a large degree, by their reporting and other such outputs. 
The motivations and reasons for such an approach are entirely understandable and, historically, many of the actions 
currently ‘outsourced’ to NGOs were supported by or carried out by states as part of their regular border activities. 
Another argument, which can create friction and lead to considerable practical problems, is the question of ‘longer 
term sustainability’. NGOs and state institutions have dramatically different roles in the management of migration and, 
as such, tend to perceive their activities and roles as operating according to sometimes starkly different timescales.43 
However, an immediate, short-term humanitarian approach can be fundamentally in conflict with someone thinking of 
longer term consequences, especially in the context of increasingly protracted humanitarian crises that leave people in 
vulnerable positions for decades.44 Mechanisms like the Sustainable Development Goals aim to bridge the short-term/
long-term divide and advocate for a concerted effort for sustainable development that alleviates the immediate crises 
in which people find themselves. Its longer-term solutions for the well-being of such people are still finding a foothold 
in terms of their application and implementation. 
A similar timescale for looking at solutions offered by non-governmental and administrative organisations will bring 
them on par with the issues that they are dealing with. Otherwise, a grassroots organisation fighting for migrants 
to have shelter will always be at odds with a local government who is thinking of the same migrants living in state-
subsidised housing in a decade’s time or the (re-)emergence of settlements like the ‘Jungle’ at Calais.45
5. The security approach: national prerogatives and international protection
However, the perspective that rights are integrated within or complementary to notions of security is not necessarily 
shared by the national authorities that are supposed to implement and enforce international migration and refugee 
law. In many instances, documented by various monitoring parties and advocacy groups, it is highly likely that many 
national authorities know that they are in violation of, willingly or through institutional praxis, applicable human rights 
norms.46 In private, they may even openly admit as much, but public acknowledgements that a particular national 
authority has violated rights in the cause of ‘national security’ are few and far between. In many circumstances, behind 
closed doors, some authorities merely invoke security considerations as a means to derogate or, at the very least, 
deviate from, and ask rhetorically ‘What are we supposed to do?’ 
The perceptions and narratives that underpin such an approach are worth examining in some detail. There may, of 
course, be entirely legitimate reasons why certain persons may pose a threat to local or national security. However, even 
if that were the case, it may be very difficult to reasonably assert that individualised threats warrant a legal framework 
that appears to assume that a ‘mass’ migration is, in itself, a threat to national security or the ordre public. Given the 
available data on crime rates and the role of migrants in recent terror attacks, or other major security incidents, the 
largely security-driven narrative that underlies much of the recent policy appears to be based on a particularly shaky premise.47 
While there have been worrying individual cases of such a nature, EUROPOL’s EU Terrorism Situation and Analysis (TE-
41 See Special Representative of the Secretary General on migration and refugees, Thematic Report on Migrant and Refugee Children SG/Inf(2017)3 
(10 March 2017); also see Report of the Fact-Finding Mission by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary General on 
Migration and Refugees to Greece and ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (7–11 March 2016). 
42 See footnote 4 above.
43 EY, Managing the Migration Crisis: From Panic to Planning (2016), pp. 14–16
44 Ibid.
45 BBC News, ‘France Will Not Allow Another “Jungle” Camp in Calais, says Macron’ (17 January 2018). 
46 See for instance, the amended Greek asylum law 2016, which removed human rights experts and UNHCR representatives from its Asylum Appeals 
Committee.
47 See Ben Emmerson, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While 
Countering Terrorism UN GA DOC A/71/384 (2017), p.5, which noted that ‘It is critical to bear in mind that, in the clear majority of cases, refugees and 
migrants do not pose a risk, but are in fact at risk, fleeing the regions where terrorist groups are the most active.’ The EUROPOL, EU Terrorism Situation 
and Analysis (TE-SAT) Report (2017) noted that, on the contrary, ‘an average of nearly 10 attacks a day were carried out on refugees in Germany in 
2016’ (p. 46). Furthermore, in Germany, several studies have found no discernible effects of immigration on violent crime, and ‘at best, moderate 
effects on property crimes’ and a marginal to minor increase in drug crimes and ‘fare-dodging’. See Markus Gehrsitz and Martin Ungerer, ‘Jobs, Crime, 
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SAT) Report (2016) noted that ‘there is no concrete evidence to date that terrorist travellers systematically use the flow 
of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed’.48 On balance, instead of reducing the risk to a potentially small number of local 
citizens, it seems highly likely that such an approach would rather risk violating the rights of a large number of non-
citizens. If, for instance, national authorities view refugees and vulnerable migrants as de jure deserving of protection 
but as de facto security threats, then this is very likely to result in adverse consequences for the realisation of their 
human rights. 
In certain countries such as Hungary, refugees and irregular migrants are often not only characterised as illegals but are 
also viewed as being on the same security continuum as transnational organised crime, drug traffickers and terrorists. 
In such places, national authorities place a much lower emphasis on human rights and the security narrative prevails.49 
For individuals and whole categories of persons, detention often follows, not as a last resort, as generally obliged under 
international law, but as a first instance measure instead.50 
This invocation of security to displace or avoid upholding obligations under international law is very problematic. A 
significant increase in irregular migration and asylum claims can be highly burdensome to the administrative state, 
and many European countries have had to hire new personnel and allocate additional resources.51 For the purposes of 
advocacy and governmental engagement, it is, naturally, a very uncomfortable topic. The reasons why this may be the 
case are myriad, but the basic notion may simply be that, when pushed, certain governments will opt for security over 
protection, conscious of their constituencies and the need to maintain authority and control over their territories.52 
For instance, the Hungarian government has stated that it is ‘doing everything possible to ensure Europe’s safety’ and 
‘stressed that it is no longer only the Visegrád countries which believe that enough uncontrolled people have already 
reached the EU, and that therefore reinforcing internal security is an important interest’.53 
Furthermore, many of the migrants and refugees are fleeing areas of active conflict and, especially regarding those 
from Syria and Iraq, there have been very prominent concerns raised, of varying plausibility, that members of terrorist 
groups or non-state armed groups may attempt to cross borders with the intention of committing terrorist attacks in 
the receiving state.54 Democratic states have, in turn, responded to certain high-profile instances with heightened anti-
immigrant rhetoric. The rise of the so-called ‘populist’ streak in politics may have failed to elect significant government 
figures, but it is quite likely that many populist movements have succeeded in pushing political discourse in a more anti-
migrant, anti-refugee and generally anti-immigration direction. Further playing on ‘nativist’ sentiment, often couched 
in terms of ‘economic anxiety’ or ‘resentment’, so-called populists often seem to conflate or blur the lines between the 
contemporary refugee crisis and current integration issues that exist from previous historical periods of migration.55 
Furthermore, confusion in the face of ‘mass influx’ has resulted in a public that is frequently ill-informed about the 
current nature of migration to their particular country, generally vastly overestimating the actual proportion of non-
native born groups and religious minorities.56 As a result, public discourse in many European states has pushed political 
leaders towards a harder migration and refugee policy in the name of ‘securing the borders’.57
National and regional migration policy has thus followed the reactionary trend visible in European political discourse, 
as new laws and administrative measures have come into effect in the past few years. Many of these provisions have 
and Votes: A Short-run Evaluation of the Refugee Crisis in Germany’, IZA Institute of Labor Economics DP No. 10494 (22 January 2017), pp. 1–3, 15–18; 
also see Government of Sweden, ‘Facts about Migration and Crime in Sweden’.
48 EUROPOL, EU Terrorism Situation and Analysis (TE-SAT) Report (2016) p. 7.
49 Jim Brundsen, ‘Europe Refugee Policy is “Trojan Horse of Terrorism”, says Orban’, Financial Times (30 March 2017). Also see ‘Today, the protection of 
Hungary and of Europe is the government’s task,’ Janos Lazar, chief of staff to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said to AP, ‘For Hungary, security 
is the most important question […] Stopping illegal immigration is a key issue.’ Quoted in Tara John, ‘Hungary has Created a Cruel System to Deter 
Migrants, Says Amnesty’, Time Magazine (27 September 2016). 
50 Human Rights Watch, ‘EU Policies Put Refugees at Risk: An Agenda to Restore Protection’ (23 November 2016). The report noted that ‘In the wake 
of the EU-Turkey deal, the Greek authorities instituted a formal policy of automatic detention for those arriving by sea on the Aegean islands.’
51 European Parliament Research Service, ‘Migration and Asylum’.
52 See Nils Muiznieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Hungary’s Duty to Refugees’, The New York Times (Opinion) (28 September 
2016), who noted that increased securitisation measures on the Hungarian border ‘come amid a campaign to demonize refugees that has been 
orchestrated by the government since 2015, when it promoted a “national consultation on immigration and terrorism” that portrayed migrants as a 
danger to Hungarian society.’ 
53 Government of Hungary, ‘Hungary is Doing Everything Possible to Ensure Europe’s safety’ (August 2016).
54 EUROPOL, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) Report (2016) noted that ‘[s]ome incidents have been identified involving terrorists 
who have made use of migratory flows to enter the EU. In the investigations into the 13 November Paris attacks, it was found that two of the attackers 
had entered the EU through Greece as part of the large influx of refugees from Syria. A number of other suspected cases, including terrorist use of 
fraudulent travelling documents, have since been identified. A real and imminent danger, and one that will probably continue to exist for a long 
time, is the potential for elements of the (Sunni Muslim) Syrian refugee diaspora to become vulnerable to radicalisation once in Europe, and to be 
specifically targeted by Islamist extremist recruiters.’ 
55 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Dr François Crépeau, UN GA DOC A/72/173 (19 July 2017), para. 22.
56 Based on polling conducted by IPSOS Mori in 40 countries, the report noted that many countries vastly overestimate the population of Muslims. 
Other polling indicates that many countries have very negative impressions of immigration, despite net economic or other benefits.
57 Upon the adoption of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in 2016, Robert Kaliňák, Minister for the Interior of Slovakia and President 
of the Council, stated that ‘[t]he way we manage our external borders directly affects the entire Schengen area, including its internal borders. The 
European Border and Coast Guard will help us better face today’s challenges together. Only with effective management of our external borders can 
we return to normality within Schengen. There is no other way.’ European Council, ‘European Border and Coast Guard: Final Approval’ (September 
2016).
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strengthened border control efforts and increased the presence of law enforcement on the borders as certain states 
have built a large security apparatus that is primarily oriented towards the maintenance of border policing. In recent 
years, major walls and fences have been erected on borders, while new reception centres, which function like detention 
centres, have been built or repurposed.58 Furthermore, in certain states, national migration or refugee officials are 
former military or security service personnel, untrained and seemingly uninterested in broader international migration 
law and the human rights framework.59 
These increased security measures bring a whole host of potential human rights problems. However, for rights groups 
and, indeed, for international organisations and agencies, when advocating for such issues with relevant authorities, 
considerations of security can be extraordinarily difficult to override or disagree with. This may simply be the result 
of the often secretive or clandestine nature of the security and threat analysis: beyond what is publicly available, 
the true nature, scope and extent of threats is a ‘known unknown’ to many international organisations or NGOs. This 
information asymmetry is problematic: it can present a real obstacle to the perceived value and validity of the human 
rights narrative among actors whose greater institutional priority ore main mandate – even whose personal preference 
– is the maintenance of law and order or national security. 
At borders, such considerations and narratives are visible in the mandate and objectives of entities such as the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency, whose primary consideration is oft-cited as security with a cursory nod in the direction 
of upholding human rights.60 Similarly, such an approach can be seen in the core mandate of Frontex.61 
For many nation-states, the response does not seem to be improving – it has recently been reported that defence officials 
from several central European countries and the Balkans have pledged close cooperation in tackling migration.62 At the 
more extreme end, some states have declared their willingness to use all possible means, up to and including the use 
of armed forces, notably seen in recent pushes towards militarisation on the Austria-Italy border.63
Furthermore, several reports from monitoring groups have noted that many procedures by authorities in so-called 
‘hotspots’ take place without a concrete legal basis, resulting in an amorphous asylum system that makes it even harder 
for migrants and asylum seekers to navigate an already complicated process.64 The word ‘hotspots’ is a problematic term 
in itself as words like this and ‘crises’ have greatly misrepresented the extent and scale of the issue. The connotation of 
hotspots is very reactionary as attention is focused on these small and narrow spaces. This completely forgoes longer 
term and more nuanced understandings of the source countries of migrants, their journey, motivations and their own 
life continuum. In effect, without a balance – or re-balance – of prevailing narratives and systemic values, such an 
approach is very troubling to the rules-based international order. 
6. The EU-Turkey statement
Many of the issues described above came to a head around the EU-Turkey ‘deal’ arranged in the Spring of 2016.65 It is 
fair to say that the deal largely reflects the security narrative rather than the rights-based narrative. Aimed at stemming 
arrivals of mostly Syrian asylum seekers and migrants from Turkey to Europe, the deal focused on those ‘not in need of 
international protection’ and sought to offer ‘migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk’.66 A key feature of the 
deal was the arrangement that for ‘every Syrian returned to Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled directly from Turkey 
to Europe’, with a cap of 72,000. The resettlement of Syrians in Europe was conditional on effective returns to Turkey 
and an end to new arrivals in Greece.
However, there are notable phrases absent from the EU-Turkey Statement, which makes no direct reference to ‘human 
rights’ or ‘values’. References to ‘protection’ are exclusively focused on those not in need of international protection. 
Subsequently, the deal was extended with a rather brief ‘joint action plan’ elaborating further actions to be taken. 
The deal, and the plan, both claim, rather tersely, that ‘all migrants will be protected in accordance with the relevant 
international standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulement’.67 Yet, neither statement elaborates on 
58 See generally, Amnesty International, ‘Fenced Out: Hungary’s Violations of the Rights of Refugees and Migrants’ (October 2015). Also see Report 
of the Fact-Finding Mission by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration and Refugees, to Bulgaria, 
13–17 November 2017, SG/Inf(2018)18 (19 April 2018), p. 15, which noted that the authorities have made considerable efforts to adapt old schools 
and military buildings into accommodation for asylum seekers.
59 For instance, the Bulgarian Border Guards have a command structure based on the military, with a former military commander in charge. 
60 See European Commission, COM(2015) 671 final (15 December 2015).
61 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 (26 October 2004), which established the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, stated that it ‘… aims at an integrated management ensuring a uniform and 
high level of control and surveillance…’ (para. 1); also see Frontex: Mission and Tasks.
62 Radko Hokovsky, ‘How Migrants Brought Central Europe Together’, Politico (2 July 2016)
63 Jennifer Rankin, ‘Austrian Troops to Stop Migrants Crossing Border with Italy’, The Guardian (4 July 2017); also see Saim Saeed, ‘Hungary’s Border 
Fence is Finished, says Orban’, Politico (4 April 2017).
64 European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), The Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy and Greece: A Study (5 December 2016), pp. 10–13, 
noted that, in Italy, for example, ‘[t]here is no dedicated legal framework on hotspots procedures and practices and conditions are governed by 
asylum legislation and the Constitution. Non-legislative documents, like the Italian Roadmap and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) define 
certain practices and responsibilities.’ Also see Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), ‘A Dramatic Deterioration for Asylum Seekers on Lesbos’ (July 2017).
65 European Commission, ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ (16 March 2016).
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. Also see Joint Action Plan on the Implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
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this point in a meaningful manner and provides little concrete detail on the implementation of these rights. From 
these texts, it is hard to see the deal’s arrangement as fully conforming with the rules of international migration law in 
principle or in practice.68 
The paradox of the EU-Turkey deal and its relation to the tension between the two competing discourses described in 
this paper is perhaps best described by Elizabeth Collett of the Migration Policy Institute when she said, 
[t]he deal has also unveiled a paradox for a EU that has spent several decades preaching its own 
high asylum standards to neighboring countries. To achieve its self-imposed goal – a significant 
reduction in arrivals and an increase in returns to Turkey – policymakers will have to drastically 
cut legal corners, potentially violating EU law on issues such as detention and the right to appeal. 
But if governments execute the agreement in conformity with international and European legal 
frameworks, few arrivals are likely to be returned, and the agreement risks becoming the latest 
in a long series of undelivered promises to exasperated publics for whom the complex legal 
conundrums of implementation are both meaningless and irrelevant.69 
It is worth briefly revisiting the rules that the EU has legislated as underpinning the EU-Turkey deal. EU law allows returns 
under two circumstances. First, individuals who do not apply or qualify for asylum are considered ‘irregular migrants’ and 
are eligible to be returned to Turkey.70 Second, individuals who submit asylum claims but are determined to have arrived 
from a ‘safe third country’ where they could have claimed protection are also considered inadmissible to the European 
Union and are thus eligible for return.71 Under the deal, Turkey is designated a ‘safe country’, a questionable assessment 
in itself, though few have been returned formally on this basis.72 Regardless, several refugees and asylum seekers have 
been returned to Turkey, with the EU Commission and national authorities claiming one reason and UNHCR and NGOs 
claiming another, with the UN later referring to the post-EU-Turkey chaos as a potential explanation for the errors.73 
However, although the deal has achieved some of its aim of lowering the flow and number of migrants to the EU,74 it 
has come under harsh criticism from organisations for its negative effect on human rights.75 Amnesty International, 
among many others, has recorded a number of instances where human rights have not been observed, particularly in 
relation to arbitrary detention practices in Greece, inhuman and degrading conditions in certain refugee camps and 
violations of the principle and rules relating to non-refoulement under the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, among 
many others.76 Furthermore, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has stated that the ‘EU-Turkey deal follows the logic of 
treating people as if they were commodities, with disastrous consequences for the people affected’ by the ‘erosion 
of essential procedural safeguards and fundamental human rights’.77 MSF further warns that the logical result of this 
is that the few ‘safeguards that currently exist, such as exemptions for vulnerable people and possibilities to appeal 
asylum decisions, are likely to be scrapped altogether’.78
As to the future of the deal, Turkey has repeatedly threatened to tear it up, which could result in a more forceful response 
from European authorities. At time of writing, EU-Turkey relations are weakening. The collapse of the deal – and the 
humanitarian assistance packages that accompany it – could see the emergence of human rights violations on a much 
broader and more worrying scale than can currently be observed. 
political/files/december2016-action-plan-migration-crisis-management_en.pdf (accessed 1 October 2018).
68 Nils Muiznieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Stop Your Backsliding, Europe’, The New York Times (Opinion) (14 March 2016), 
noted that ‘[i]n exchange for concessions on visa requirements for Turks traveling to Europe, the European Union is asking Ankara to take back all 
migrants, including refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, and others, who are currently crossing from Turkey into Greece by irregular means; 
the European Union proposes in turn to accept an equivalent number of Syrian refugees directly from Turkey. Some union officials are portraying 
this deal as a good solution to the crisis. In reality, the automatic forced return that the deal allows is illegal and will be ineffective. It is illegal because 
forced returns run contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits the collective expulsions of aliens. They also violate the 
right to seek asylum that was established in 1948 by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and contravene guarantees established by the 
1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, which recognizes that seeking asylum can require refugees to breach immigration rules.’ See, for instance, 
Greek Council for Refugees, Aitima, European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Solidarity Now, ‘Re: Joint Action Plan on EU-Turkey Statement and 
Resumption of Dublin Transfers to Greece’ (15 December 2016). 
69 Elizabeth Collett, The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, Migration Policy Institute (March 2016).
70 European Commission, ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ (16 March 2016).
71 Ibid.
72 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Wrong Counts and Closing Doors: The Receptions of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Europe, Asylum 
Information Database (2016), pp. 25–26. Also see Amnesty International, ‘Greece: Court Decisions Pave Way for First Forcible Returns of Asylum 
Seekers under EU-Turkey Deal’ (22 September 20170, which outlined a recent decision by Greece’s highest administrative court to forcibly send two 
Syrian refugees to Turkey, declaring their asylum claims inadmissible and implying that Turkey was a ‘safe country’ for return. 
73 See Amnesty International, ‘The EU-Turkey Deal: Europe’s Year of Shame’ (20 March 2017). 
74 European Commission, Seventh Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2017) 470 final (6 
September 2017), noted that ‘irregular crossings from Turkey to the EU remain at a very low level and that almost 9,000 Syrian refugees have been 
resettled from Turkey to the EU’. Also see European Commission, ‘EU-Turkey Statement: One Year On’ (March 2016). 
75 See Ashleigh Lovett, Claire Whelan, Renata Rendón, Joint Agency Briefing Note, ‘The Reality of the EU-Turkey Statement’ (17 March 2017).
76 Amnesty International, ‘A Blueprint for Despair: Human Rights Impact of the EU-Turkey Deal’ (2017), pp. 8–10, 18–19.
77 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), ‘One Year on From the EU-Turkey Deal: Challenging the EU’s Alternative Facts’ (March 2017), pp. 5–7.
78 Ibid. p. 19.
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7. Conclusions 
At the crux of this paper lie questions about the narratives that underpin many of the recent developments that have 
shaped the implementation of the international migration law framework in Europe. The clash of the rights-based 
narrative and security-oriented narratives have been shown to have profound consequences on public and policy 
discourse. As such, finding feasible ways to make the competing narratives more consistent, more cohesive and more 
coherent is key to coordinating an improved response to issues relating to migration. 
To bridge the gulf between these many competing narratives, it is important to try to focus primarily on cooperation 
so as to achieve a common understanding on certain points. For instance, at a fundamental level, there remains a 
perception gap between those who view migration as problematic in terms of security and those who view migration as 
a humanitarian matter. As such, a gap emerges between those who see the consequent rights as duties and obligations 
for the purposes of protection and assistance, and those who view such rights as ideals and aspirations that can, or 
indeed should, be sought only where security can be assured. Complicating matters further, there remain considerable 
inconsistencies in the normative framework to deal with temporal issues. This also leads to a situation where various 
actors have major difficulties in coordinating, planning and implementing policies in relation to action to be taken 
immediately as well as in the short and long term, especially in terms of protection. The failure to prepare for the long 
term has often resulted in undesirable downstream effects for all involved. 
Though the rights-based discourse may be on the back foot, there are powerful, pragmatic and persuasive arguments for 
the presence of rights-oriented actors in the policy discourse process, particularly when it comes to the implementation 
and oversight of migration and refugee law on the ground. Among the many partnerships between state and non-state 
actors, there is space for the enhancement of formal and informal dialogue processes and other forms of advocacy. This 
will ensure that there is a common understanding of the prerogatives of security apparatuses as well as rights groups. 
This may entail recognition of and engagement with national or international considerations and concerns about 
security alongside a narrative that inspires rather than demonises migrants and refugees.79 However, the limitations 
of certain institutional mandates may make such an approach not just undesirable, but also incompatible with core 
values and political prerogatives. Engaging on these issues should not in any way diminish or weaken human rights 
protections and the rule of law necessary in managing migration issues. 
The international migration law framework is, between the various international, regional and national actors, a 
labyrinthine, byzantine system with an unclear division of duties, labour, tasks and responsibilities. High-level political 
discourse may be a key factor in leading the shift away from a rights-oriented discourse as humanitarian resources are 
‘outsourced’ with the non-government sector taking over traditional nation-state migration and refugee protection; at 
the same time, state institutions are under pressure to shift towards providing oversight and maintaining the security 
and administrative framework. This is not just a problem for those working within the system, it is also a major concern for 
the migrants and refugees themselves, as they attempt to navigate such a complex and shifting behemoth. Addressing 
these failures appears to present an extraordinary political challenge. What is clear is that these competing approaches 
are leaving vulnerable populations underserved, as is the case with the EU-Turkey deal in relation to Syrians. 
Taking steps to resolve the fundamental narrative conflicts at the policy discourse level would hopefully be a significant 
step towards improving the implementation of the rights of migrants on the ground. Despite the overwhelming 
pressures on national governments and international organisations, significant normative improvements are necessary 
in order to ensure sustainable progress in this regard. But without the political will necessary to shift the narrative 
dynamic, the risk is very real: if we do not address the chronic imbalances and inconsistencies at the heart of the system, 
the confusion and chaotic approaches that follow will continue to run the risk of relegating human rights even further 
down the list of national priorities. Without continued efforts to improve and enhance the structural harmony of the 
international migration and refugee system, the continued harm to vulnerable populations will be felt for generations. 
79 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Dr François Crépeau, UN GA DOC A/72/173 (19 July 2017), para. 19.
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